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“THE HINDRANCE OF A LAW DEGREE”: JUSTICE KAGAN ON 
LAW AND EXPERIENCE 
LAURA KRUGMAN RAY∗ 
Elena Kagan, the current United States Supreme Court’s newest 
Justice, has also proven to be its most innovative writer.  In place of the 
usually dry and formal prose that readers of the Court’s opinions have long 
encountered (with Justice Scalia’s vigorous dissents and Chief Justice 
Roberts’s urbane observations the rare exceptions), she consistently leavens 
her judicial prose with an assortment of rhetorical devices.  Her arsenal 
includes colloquial diction, direct invitations to the reader to participate in 
her analytic process, and vivid metaphors that link legal argument to the 
experience of everyday life.  That stylistic approach is not merely 
decorative or playful.  It is intended to bridge the gap between authoring 
Justice and lay reader, a strategy that Kagan has explicitly embraced.  In a 
recent interview she said of her opinion writing that she “tr[ies] very hard to 
make it understandable to a broad audience.”1  And “one of the ways” of 
reaching that audience is “to drop the legalese” and “try to express things in 
the way  people would express it in normal conversation.”2 
I have elsewhere written in detail about what I have called Kagan’s 
“doctrinal conversation,” her determined effort through these devices to 
make her opinions accessible and persuasive to readers unfamiliar with the 
language of the law.3  In this article I go a step further and argue that 
Kagan’s rhetoric also suggests a more subversive position: that legal 
doctrine should, at its core, be grounded in the texture of common 
experience and understandable through the same lens that non-lawyers use 
to assess questions of responsibility and fairness.  The Court’s holdings, in 
short, should make sense to lawyers and non-lawyers alike.  If those 
holdings cannot be expressed persuasively in terms that non-lawyers can 
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 1.  Interview by Wendy Collins Purdue, Dean, University of Richmond School of Law with 
Justice Elena Kagan, Richmond, Va. (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.c-span.org/video/?308291-
1/conversation-supreme-court-justice-elena-kagan.  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Laura Krugman Ray, Doctrinal Conversation: Elena Kagan’s Supreme Court Opinions, 
89 IND. L.J. SUPP. 1 (2013). 
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appreciate, then perhaps they should not persuade the Justices who have 
been too quick to endorse them. 
One of the most striking aspects of Kagan’s opinions is her insistence 
on prompting the reader to play an active role in reading the text rather than 
passively accepting a Justice’s expert analysis, even when that analysis is 
Kagan’s own.  She may invite her reader simply to “consider”4 an element 
of the case under review or challenge that reader to “suppose”5 or 
“pretend”6 or “imagine”7 a variant of the accepted version of the case in 
order to reach a different outcome.  More assertively, she may tell the 
reader to “put on blinders” and then “take off those blinders”8 in order to 
grasp the full implications of a statutory subsection or instead to put two 
statutory sections “together—say, in the form of a syllogism, to make the 
point obvious.”9  Sympathizing with the reader’s exertion in the latter case, 
she offers the reassurance that “[i]f you need to take a deep breath after all 
that, you’re not alone.”10  This is a shared activity, one that makes the 
reader a silent partner in the decisionmaking process and prepares him to 
reject the other side’s tortuous argument.  When Kagan, writing for the 
Court, concludes that “[i]t would be hard to dream up a more roundabout 
way of bifurcating judicial review,” the reader, whether lawyer or lay 
person, may well share the satisfaction of having earned a stake in that 
conclusion.11 
Kagan’s occasional use of metaphor and simile serves a related role of 
engagement, allowing the lay reader to analogize a legal issue to familiar 
experience.  In Fox v. Vice,12 the Court faced the complicated question of 
when a defendant may recover fees under Section 1988 for expenses 
incurred defending against a civil rights suit raising both frivolous and non-
frivolous claims.13  Explaining why the statutory language alone fails to 
provide courts with clear-cut standards, Kagan offers a familiar simile: 
 These standards would be easy to apply if life were like the 
movies, but that is usually not the case.  In Hollywood, litigation 
most often concludes with a dramatic verdict that leaves one party 
fully triumphant and the other utterly prostrate.  The court in such 
                                                          
 4.  Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 970 (2012). 
 5.  Match-E-Be-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2205 (2012). 
 6.  Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2838 (2010) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 7.  Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2290 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 8.  Id. at 2293 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 9.  Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 604 (2012). 
 10.  Id. at 605. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  131 S. Ct. 2205 (2011).  
 13.  Id. at 2211. 
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a case would know exactly how to award fees (even if that anti-
climactic scene is generally left on the cutting-room floor).  But 
in the real world, litigation is more complex, involving multiple 
claims for relief that implicate a mix of legal theories and have 
different merits.  . . . In short, litigation is messy, and courts must 
deal with this untidiness in awarding fees.14 
For the reader familiar with litigation only through the Hollywood version, 
the analogy serves as both a friendly introduction to the complexity of civil 
rights cases and a serious caution that courts have to deal with a far messier 
reality than filmmakers, who can simply delete unwieldy complications.  
Although that reality may not lend itself to the simplified approach of 
fictional courts, Kagan suggests that the problem, if not the solution, is still 
understandable by non-lawyers. 
In Judulang v. Holder,15 a case involving the disparate standards for 
providing waiver rights to excludable and deportable aliens under a federal 
statutory scheme, the Court confronted an even messier case, and Kagan 
finds an even more flexible analogy to illustrate the basis for its holding.  
Observing that eligibility for a waiver depended on “the chance 
correspondence” of two statutory schemes, she underscores the irrational 
quality of the challenged test by comparing it to another common 
experience: the coin toss.16  If, she notes, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
had itself chosen the coin toss as its method of deciding which aliens could 
apply for a waiver—“heads an alien may apply for relief, tails he may 
not”—the Court wouldn’t hesitate to strike it down as arbitrary.17  
Extending her analogy to counter some of the government’s arguments in 
defense of its approach, she rejects the argument based on its “vintage,” 
noting that “flipping coins to determine Section 212(c) eligibility would 
remain as arbitrary on the thousandth try as on the first.”18  Rejecting as 
well the government’s economic defense of its position, she notes that 
“cheapness alone cannot validate an arbitrary agency policy. (If it could, 
flipping coins would be a valid way to determine an alien’s eligibility for a 
waiver.)”19  These refinements of the original image provide a sustained 
visual analogy for the Court’s rejection of the government’s argument, one 
that non-lawyers can grasp without mastering the complicated statutory 
framework. 
                                                          
 14.  Id. at 2213–14. 
 15.  132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). 
 16.  Id. at 484. 
 17.  Id. at 485. 
 18.  Id. at 488. 
 19.  Id. at 490. 
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Kagan has used a similar strategy in several other cases.  Dissenting 
from a rape conviction, she has argued that the Confrontation Clause 
requires the direct testimony of the technician who produced the DNA 
profile linking the defendant to the crime, and thus the bare testimony of an 
analyst about the implications of that profile is insufficient.20  “If the 
Confrontation Clause prevents the State from getting its evidence in 
through the front door,” she insists, “then the State could sneak it in through 
the back.  What a neat trick—but really, what a way to run a criminal 
justice system.”21  The front door or back door imagery, supported by the 
unwholesome implications of “sneak” and “trick,” brands the majority’s 
holding as an evasive ruse that even a lay reader can detect.  Writing for the 
Court to reverse an enhanced sentence based on an incorrect reading of the 
relevant statute, Kagan notes that the lower court erred in viewing the crime 
“as containing an infinite number of sub-crimes corresponding to ‘all the 
possible ways an individual can commit’ it.”22  To illustrate her point, she 
then offers, in an aside, a helpfully  exaggerated  analogy based on Clue, a 
board game familiar to both lay and legal readers: “(Think: Professor Plum, 
in the ballroom, with the candlestick?  Colonel Mustard, in the 
conservatory, with the rope, on a snowy day, to cover up his affair with 
Mrs. Peacock?).”23  The evocation of a childhood pastime in the sentencing 
context signals that the lower court’s unreasonably expansive interpretation 
is itself a misguided judicial game rather than a thoughtful reading of the 
statute.  And in a recent dissent taking the majority to task for an 
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act that forecloses any avenue to 
relief for the petitioners’ antitrust claim, Kagan concludes her opinion with 
another vivid metaphor.  “To a hammer,” she writes, “everything looks like 
a nail.”24  The majority’s position is thus a blunt instrument applied without 
sufficient discrimination to reach a target unintended by the statutory 
scheme.  Her image is brief and pithy, an efficient and effective way to 
make her point. 
As the recent case of Florida v. Jardines25 demonstrates, however, for 
Kagan an analogy can serve as something more than a single vivid image.  
At issue in Jardines was whether the detection of marijuana by a trained 
police dog from the porch of a private home is a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Kagan opens her concurring opinion by announcing that 
                                                          
 20.  Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).   
 21.  Id. at 2272. 
 22.  Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2290–91 (2013). 
 23.  Id. at 2291. 
 24.  American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013). 
 25.  133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
  
14 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 74:10 
“[f]or me, a simple analogy clinches this case.”26  She then presents that 
analogy, a detailed scenario that parallels Jardines’s facts: 
 A stranger comes to the front door of your home carrying 
super-high-powered binoculars.  . . . He doesn’t knock or say 
hello.  Instead, he stands on the porch and uses the binoculars to 
peer through your windows, into your home’s furthest corners.  It 
doesn’t take long (the binoculars are really very fine): In just a 
couple of minutes, his uncommon behavior allows him to learn 
details of your life you disclose to no one.  Has your visitor 
trespassed on your property, exceeding the license you have 
granted to members of the public to, say, drop off the mail or 
distribute campaign flyers?  Yes, he has.27 
The police dog, like the binoculars, is “a super-sensitive instrument,” and 
the fact that the instrument is “animal, not mineral” in no way undermines 
the analogy.28  Expanding the comparison, she adds that highly trained 
police dogs “are to the poodle down the street as high-powered binoculars 
are to a piece of plain glass.”29  Kagan bases her argument squarely—and 
entirely—on her invented scenario and its relation to the facts before the 
Court.  “That case,” she assures the reader, “is this case in every way that 
matters.”30 
Kagan’s reliance on analogical reasoning is scarcely surprising, since 
it bears some relation to her stated preference for the familiar over the 
novel.  She makes that point expressly in Martel v. Clair,31 where the Court 
was asked to adopt a tougher standard for substitution of new counsel in a 
criminal case.32  In light of the State’s concession that its proposed test 
came, as Kagan puts it, “well, from nowhere,” she declines to venture into 
new territory.33  “Inventiveness is often an admirable quality,” she muses, 
“but here we think the State overdoes it.  . . . [We] prefer to copy something 
familiar than concoct something novel.”34  The verb “concoct” efficiently 
conveys her skepticism toward unnecessarily creative legal arguments 
where reliable doctrine exists.  In a similar spirit, she joins Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion in Jardines, which relied on the police intent to conduct a 
search of the defendant’s home, but writes separately to ground her 
argument as well in the realm of familiar human (and canine) experience. 
                                                          
 26.  Id. at 1418. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012).  
 32.  Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012). 
 33.  Id. at 1285. 
 34.  Id.  
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That reliance on familiar experience is a recurring theme in Kagan’s 
opinions.  In Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 
Kagan dissented from the Court’s decision rejecting on standing grounds an 
Establishment Clause challenge to a law allowing taxpayers making 
voluntary contributions to a religious school to receive a state income tax 
credit.35  In support of her view that Flast v. Cohen36 clearly provided 
standing for the challenge, she offers what she terms “an example far afield 
from Flast.”37  In her scenario, one with a familiar ring, the government 
decides to provide insolvent banks with hundreds of billions of dollars, and 
many taxpayers object strenuously: 
In the face of this hostility, some Members of Congress make the 
following proposal: Rather than give the money to banks via 
appropriations, the Government will allow banks to subtract the 
exact same amount from the tax bill they would otherwise have to 
pay to the U.S. Treasury.  Would this proposal calm the furor?  
Or would most taxpayers respond by saying that a subsidy is a 
subsidy (or a bailout is a bailout), whether accomplished by the 
one means or by the other?  Surely the latter; indeed, we would 
think the less of our countrymen if they failed to see through this 
cynical proposal.38 
The protesting taxpayers would have no difficulty seeing through the 
alternate proposal and, Kagan suggests, neither should the Court on the 
facts before it.  “What ordinary people would appreciate,” she continues, 
“this Court’s case law also recognizes.”  She explains how this is so by 
citing precedent for the view that “targeted tax breaks are often 
economically and functionally indistinguishable from a direct monetary 
subsidy.”39  The common sense attributed to “ordinary people,” who would 
need no knowledge of legal precedent to see the right response to the statute 
at issue, here helps to trump the majority’s holding. 
Kagan’s endorsement of common experience over legal expertise as an 
interpretive tool manifests itself in a number of ways.  Applying a federal 
railroad statute, she is unmoved when “Alabama dresses up” its legal 
argument “in Latin” by relying on the interpretive canon ejusdem generis.40  
She finds instead that “the better version of Alabama’s claim reads entirely 
in English” and is much more persuasive.41  And, interpreting a criminal 
flight statute, she observes that the Court does not “proceed by exploring 
                                                          
 35.  Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
 36.  Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 37.  Ariz. Christian School Tuition Org., 131 S. Ct. at 1455 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 38.  Id. at 1455–56. 
 39.  Id. at 1456. 
 40.  CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1113 (2011). 
 41.  Id. 
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whether some platonic form of an offense—here, some abstract notion of 
vehicular flight—satisfies ACCA’s residual clause.  We instead focus on 
the elements of the actual state statute at issue.”42 
Not surprisingly, Kagan’s approach leads her to formulate her legal 
arguments in terms accessible to both her legal and lay readers.  In Williams 
v. Illinois,43 the Confrontation Clause case discussed earlier, the issue was 
whether an expert witness should be permitted to testify about the 
implications of the defendant’s DNA profile when the technician who had 
created the profile did not take the stand.  Addressing that issue in her 
dissent, Kagan asks her readers to “[c]onsider a prosaic example not 
involving scientific evidence”:44 
An eyewitness tells a police officer investigating an assault that 
the perpetrator had an unusual, star-shaped birthmark over his left 
eye.  The officer arrests a person bearing that birthmark (let’s call 
him Starr) for committing the offense.  And at trial, the officer 
takes the stand and recounts just what the eyewitness told him.  
Presumably the plurality would agree that such testimony violates 
the Confrontation Clause unless the eyewitness is unavailable and 
the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him.  Now 
ask whether anything changes if the officer couches his testimony 
in the following way: “I concluded that Starr was the assailant 
because a reliable witness told me that the assailant had a star-
shaped birthmark and, look, Starr has one just like that.”45 
Justice Alito, writing for the Williams majority, held that the expert’s 
testimony about the DNA profile was offered “solely for the purpose of 
explaining the assumptions on which” her own opinion rested and should 
“thus fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause.”46  By translating 
the subject of the testimony from the specialized knowledge of the two 
analysts to the conversation of a police officer with a witness, Kagan 
reframes the issue.  In her version, the police officer is clearly relying on 
what he has heard from the absent witness, and thus his testimony should be 
precluded.  The “prosaic example” suggests that the majority has been led 
astray by the scientific window dressing of the testimony and has failed to 
focus on the substance of the exchange.  “Allowing the admission of this 
evidence,” Kagan concludes, “would end-run the Confrontation Clause, and 
make a parody of its strictures.”47 
                                                          
 42.  Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2289 (2011). 
 43.  132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).  
 44.  Id. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting).   
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id. at 2228 (majority opinion). 
 47.  Id. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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In light of her preference for accessible arguments, it should be no 
surprise that Kagan prefers to root her opinions in concrete situations rather 
than theoretical abstractions.  She is skeptical of assumptions that “would 
have no real-world meaning or application” and would “serve[] only to 
address a make-believe problem.”48  Criticizing the majority for basing its 
interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act on a mistaken view of the 
law, she plays out the consequences.  “The decision,” she argues, “would 
turn out to be the most one-off of one-offs,” and she advises her readers to 
act accordingly.49  “Feel free,” she instructs, “to relegate the majority’s 
decision to the furthest reaches of your mind: The situation it addresses 
should never again arise.”50 
Kagan prefers to derive her own assumptions from ordinary and 
recurring experience.  When she asks her readers to “assume” that a 
defendant has given up his right to trial by pleading guilty to a lesser 
offense, she adds parenthetically “(as happens every day)” to reassure them 
that this is a commonplace event.51  And although “a court blessed with 
sufficient time and imagination could devise a laundry list of potential 
‘weapons’” not included in the applicable sentencing statute, such 
imaginative additions are not relevant to the case.52  “But the thing about 
hypothetical lists,” she observes dryly, “is that they are, well, 
hypothetical.”53  When she offers her own hypothetical list of the various 
ways in which a landowner could pay an obligation imposed by a 
government water district—”a checking account, shares of stock, a wealthy 
uncle”—the options are both familiar and whimsical.54  Unlike the 
hypothetical weapons list, which would depart from the statutory 
framework,  Kagan’s list is presented purely to illustrate her point that the 
landowner was not required to meet his obligation by surrendering part of 
his property. 
A recent opinion illustrates her method of engaging the lay reader 
directly in the Court’s decisionmaking process by drawing on familiar 
human experiences.  In Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo 
Nordisk,55 the outcome depended on the meaning of the common phrase 
                                                          
 48.  Genesis Healthcare Corporation v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1533, 1535 (2013) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting). 
 49.  Id. at 1533. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2289 (2013). 
 52.  Id. at 2290. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2607 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 55.  Caraco Pharm. Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012).  
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“not an.”56  When Novo sued Caraco, the manufacturer of a generic drug 
that would compete with Novo’s own product, for infringement of its 
patent, Caraco in turn counterclaimed.  The relevant statute authorizes a 
counterclaim “on the ground that the patent does not claim . . . an approved 
method of using the drug.”57 The question before the Court was whether the 
statutory language “not an” meant, as Novo argued, “not any” or, as Caraco 
argued, meant “not a particular one.”58  Addressing this interpretational 
dilemma, Kagan writing for the Court decided that the answer was “‘It 
depends.’”59  To explain why, under the statute’s language, Caraco should 
prevail, she offers an extended illustration of the way context determines 
meaning: 
If your spouse tells you he is late because he “did not take a cab,” 
you will infer that he took no cab at all (but took the bus instead).  
If your child admits that she “did not read a book all summer,” 
you will surmise that she did not read any book (but went to the 
movies a lot).  And if a sports-fan friend bemoans that “the New 
York Mets do not have a chance of winning the World Series,” 
you will gather that the team has no chance whatsoever (because 
they have no hitting).  But now stop a moment.  Suppose your 
spouse tells you that he got lost because “he did not make a turn.”  
You would understand that he failed to make a particular turn, not 
that he drove from the outset in a straight line.  Suppose your 
child explains her mediocre grade on a college exam by saying 
that she “did not read an assigned text.”  You would infer that she 
failed to read a specific book, not that she read nothing at all on 
the syllabus.  And suppose that a lawyer friend laments that in her 
last trial, she “did not prove an element of the offense.”  You 
would grasp that she is speaking not of all the elements, but of a 
particular one.  The examples could go on and on, but the point is 
simple enough: When it comes to the meaning of “not an,” 
context matters.60 
In this passage Kagan asks the reader to consider a series of ordinary 
conversations with a spouse, a child, or a friend, confident that in each 
instance the reader will interpret those conversations in the same way that 
the Court is interpreting the statute’s text.  No legal expertise is required to 
grasp the point; in fact, the absence of legal expertise, Kagan suggests, 
helps to clarify why the Court should answer as it does and accept Caraco’s 
argument.  The passage bridges two varieties of speech—personal and 
                                                          
 56.  Id. at 1680–81. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 1681. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id.  
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technical—to resolve a disputed provision by accepting “the most natural 
reading of a statute.”61 
Kagan uses a variant of the same strategy in American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant,62 where she dissents from the Court’s decision 
enforcing an arbitration provision barring a restaurant owner from pursuing 
his antitrust claim.63  She opens her opinion with what she terms “a nutshell 
version of the case, unfortunately obscured in the Court’s decision” 
effectively insulating Amex from any antitrust liability.64  She then adds 
“the nutshell version of today’s opinion, admirably flaunted rather than 
camouflaged: Too darn bad”; that is, there is no recourse available for the 
plaintiff.65  Those “nutshell” versions suggest that even a reader 
unacquainted with the complicated doctrines of antitrust law should be able 
to grasp the basic unfairness of the majority decision.  After setting out the 
Court’s precedents, she offers the reader a clearly defined choice between 
her position and the majority’s: “So down one road: More arbitration, better 
enforcement of federal statutes.  And down the other: Less arbitration, 
poorer enforcement of federal statutes.  Which would you prefer?  Or still 
more aptly: Which do you think Congress would?”66  The reader is now 
pressed into service as a surrogate decisionmaker, first asked to choose his 
preferred outcome and then, more challengingly, to choose the outcome that 
Congress, in passing the statute, would prefer.  The doctrinal intricacies of 
the case are transformed to a clear-cut choice between protecting Amex and 
protecting the small business owner.  And the reader, now the 
decisionmaker, has been led inevitably to the common sense conclusion that 
the Court has rejected. 
Kagan’s reliance on ordinary experience as a valid basis for legal 
analysis is a recurring theme in her opinions.  In a second case dealing with 
a police dog’s detection of drugs, this time in the defendant’s automobile, 
she defines the probable cause standard as “whether all the facts 
surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would 
make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal 
contraband or evidence of a crime.”67  In this case, there is substantial 
evidence of the dog Aldo’s training and prior success in the detection of 
drugs.  Since “[a] sniff is up to snuff when it meets” the probable cause test, 
                                                          
 61.  Id. at 1682. 
 62.  133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).  
 63.  Id. at 2312. 
 64.  Id. at 2313. 
 65.  Id.  
 66.  Id. at 2315. 
 67.  Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1058 (2013). 
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“Aldo’s did.”68  In her Williams dissent she complains that neither Justice 
Alito’s plurality opinion nor Justice Breyer’s concurrence on the damaging 
impact of requiring the DNA analyst to testify “provides any evidence, even 
by way of anecdote,” suggesting that she would have been receptive to the 
latter commonplace source.69  And writing for the majority in a case dealing 
with public access to the Navy’s maps of explosives, she rejects the 
argument that those maps fall within the category of protected personnel 
files because “[n]o one staring at these charts of explosions and using 
ordinary language would describe them in this manner.”70  Once again, the 
lay person’s perspective is a valid basis for resolving a legal question. 
Perhaps Kagan’s strongest endorsement of the ordinary person’s 
ability to assess and resolve legal issues comes in Arizona Free Enterprise 
Club Freedom PAC v. Bennett,71 where the Court struck down Arizona’s 
campaign finance matching fund provision as a burden on political speech 
under the First Amendment.72  Under that provision, the candidate choosing 
to accept public financing first receives a lump-sum payment from the state.  
Thereafter, “for every dollar his privately funded opponent (or the 
opponent’s supporters) spends over the initial subsidy, the publicly funded 
candidate will—to a point—get an additional 94 cents.”73  His public 
funding is capped at three times the initial lump sum, however much money 
his privately funded rival spends.  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a five-
Justice majority, found that the state’s “cash subsidy, conferred in response 
to political speech, penalizes speech” by the privately funded candidate.74 
In sharp contrast, Kagan’s dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Sotomayor, finds that, far from burdening speech, the Arizona 
law has created what she calls “the Goldilocks solution, which produces the 
‘just right’ grant to ensure that a participant in the system has the funds 
needed to run a competitive race.”75  The fairy tale reference suggests that 
the law has a kind of childlike simplicity in its determination to treat all 
competing candidates fairly.  “Except in a world gone topsy-turvy,” she 
argues, “additional campaign speech and electoral competition is not a First 
Amendment injury.”76  The petitioners attacking the statute “are making a 
novel argument that Arizona violated their First Amendment rights by 
disbursing funds to other speakers even though they could have received 
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(but chose to spurn) the same financial assistance.”77  In an appeal to the 
non-legal universe, she observes that “[s]ome people might call that 
chutzpah.”78 
Placing herself squarely among those people, she offers her strongest 
endorsement of the lay person’s ability to reject legal subterfuge and reach 
the heart of the matter: “If an ordinary citizen, without the hindrance of a 
law degree, thought this result an upending of First Amendment values, he 
would be correct.”79  It is the legal blinders worn by the majority that 
prevent its members, all apparently hindered by their law degrees, from 
seeing the simple fairness of Arizona’s solution.  Turning directly to those 
perceptive ordinary citizens, she offers them a choice of campaign finance 
approaches: 
Pretend you are financing your campaign through private 
donations.  Would you prefer that your opponent receive a 
guaranteed, upfront payment of $150,000, or that he receive only 
$50,000, with the possibility—a possibility that you mostly get to 
control—of collecting another $100,000 somewhere down the 
road?  Me too.80 
In Kagan’s scenario, the non-lawyers once again have penetrated the legal 
fog to see what the members of the majority have missed—that Arizona’s 
plan actually gives the privately funded candidate some control over how 
much money his opponent receives.  When Kagan joins in the conversation 
with her “Me too” response, she is taking her place among the 
commonsensical lay people who grasp the way the campaign finance law 
will actually operate. 
Kagan is not the first member of the Court to appreciate the 
importance of communicating directly with lay readers as well as lawyers.  
Chief Justice Warren specifically instructed the clerk assigned to draft the 
Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education81 to produce a text that 
would be “readable by the lay public.”82  And Hugo Black instructed his 
law clerk that an opinion should be written so that “‘your momma’” could 
understand it.83  Justice Kagan is, however, the first Justice to adopt that 
perspective as a central element of her jurisprudence, not only in the 
language she uses but, more fundamentally, in the way she crafts her 
arguments.  Since the law is grounded in human experience, she suggests, 
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the Court’s decisions, properly expressed, should reach and persuade both 
the lay and legal communities.  And, in her brief tenure on the Court, she 
has crafted a jurisprudential voice that speaks to both. 
 
 
